"Myanmar[1] would voluntarily forego its turn to
chair. This would be a good solution”. Singapore’s Foreign Minister
George Yeo wrote this in 9th June 2005 issue of Financial Times. A
day before, Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda told a
parliamentary hearing that “his feeling from the April meeting of foreign
ministers in the Philippines island of Cebu was that Myanmar would probably not
take its turn.”[2]
These are the some of the strongest hints ASEAN members ever suggested to a
fellow member in 38 years of the grouping’s history. Recognizing the pressure, Burmese Foreign
Minister Nyan Win told his ASEAN counterparts in 27th July 2005 at Vientiane retreat that
his country would forego the association’s chairmanship in 2006. Everyone was
relieved. The junta has for the first time bowed to an external pressure since
coming to power in 1988.
Encouraged
by its success influencing the junta in July, ASEAN set for a new
push, to send grouping’s envoy to Burma to evaluate the nation’s
democratic reforms, and it was accepted.
After several months of delays from the Burmese side, Foreign Minister
Syed Hamid of Malaysia as an
ASEAN envoy finally went Rangoon
in March 2006 with high expectations. Upon arrival Mr. Hamid was told that he
would meet neither the junta leader General Than Shwe nor house-confined
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Feeling discouraged, Mr. Hamid left Rangoon a day earlier
than the original schedule. The pressure has since cooled down. Burmese
newspapers still run daily reports of organized gatherings where attendees
pledge “to crush both internal and external destructive elements” [3].
Disappointed by its inability to deal with unpredictable generals, ASEAN
announced in May 2006 that it wanted to leave the Myanmar issue to UN. Mr. Syed Hamid
said “Myanmar
does not need us for solving their issue. So it is best that it is handled by
UN”[4].
It was the official admission of the failure of ASEAN’s long argued
constructive engagement policy toward Burma. Scholars and politicians
began to ponder what’s next for the ASEAN and the world community in dealing
with Burma.
ASEAN just admitted that it has failed. Sanctions led by US and EU so far did
nothing to change the regime’s stand. It is time to reexamine international
approach toward Burma
as well as understanding of the country and its generals.
Firstly, we shall
look at some patterns of Burma’s
international relations in the recent past. Some analysts said it was out of
nationalism and pride in 1998 when the junta turned down a purported UN-World
Bank offer of $ 1 billion financial aid in exchange of a promise to soften its
stance on opposition[5].
In his response to the offer, Burma’s
Economic Planning minister Brigadier-General David Abel said “we cannot trade
off our country’s sovereignty for $1 billion or $10 billion or $100 billion.”[6] So
the question is: Are these Burmese generals arrogant, stubborn, and really
value national pride? Another look at recent history proved otherwise. In fact
in 1987, the BSPP [7]
government, the predecessor of the current military regime, made the most
astonishing prejudice to the so called
national pride. Hoping to restructure mounting foreign debt, the BSPP regime
deliberately applied to the United Nations to declare Burma one of
the “Least Developed Countries (LDC),” although the country would not qualify
statistically. It was a successful lobbying. Burma was granted LDC status in
1987 UN General Assembly[8]. Based
on the above two patterns as well as with the foregoing of ASEAN chairmanship,
we are now able to establish that national pride is not an ultimate concern for
the junta.
Secondly, we shall
study socio and economic ideology and views of successive military regimes of Burma.
Aung-Thwin(1989) argued that 1962 coup led by General Ne Win disconnected Burma
from colonial legacies and linked the country back to her pre-colonial past.
According to his theory, Burmese finds security and comfort of life only by
seeking the purer past.
“One could become modern
and survive (but then no longer be a genuine ‘Burmese’), or one could resist,
retain one’s identity, and not modernize in a fundamental way. As so many times
in the past, Burma
met dramatic and traumatic changes, ultimately, by a return to the comfort and
security of the past” [9]
The traditional
Burmese concept of power is centered around man’s ability and merit called phun (glory), hna-lone (soul), and lat-yone
(physique)[10].
If we agree with Aung-Thwin’s theory, we find Burmese generals’ view of modern
world as immoral and a threat to Burmese way of life. A sense of insecurity was
rooted as such at the heart of military regime from the beginning. When Ne Win
and his Revolutionary Council government announced “The Burmese Way to
Socialism” policy statement in 28th April 1962, the first sentence
of the announcement reads:
“(The Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma) does not
believe that man will be set free from social evils as long as pernicious
economic systems exist in
which man exploits man and lives on the fat of such
appropriation.” [11]
Trager (1966:210)
commented: “It (the military regime) has instituted a far-reaching socialist
nationalized economy. It relies heavily on central planning and ‘common
ownership’ to promote sufficiency and contentment of all.” And Badgley
(1989:75) said “the reason the most senior officials still look inward and
backward to some mystical tradition of Burmeseness, in antiquity, is to be
found in a simple fear of foreign ideas”. Lee Kuan Yew’s (2000:361) personal
note on Ne Win apparently agrees with these views[12]. Taylor (2005:16) argues
that the legacy and the idea of 1962 coup leaders have been brought forward to
the beliefs of the present day regime. Today, one of the economic goals of the
SPDC (State Peace and Development Council)[13]
reads: “The driving force of the national economy must be in hands of the state
and the citizens”, and one of the mottos in the People’s Desire statement
reads: “Resist foreign powers those who interfere the state’s domestic affairs”[14].
Insecurity is presence in the generals’ mind dominantly and constantly.
Thirdly, we shall
observe geopolitics of Burma
and how successive regimes capitalize this in the country’s foreign relations. Burma is geographically positioned at the crossroad
of China, India and the
ASEAN, and has adopted a neutral foreign policy since 1948 independence.
Sensitivity to immediate neighbors also earns Burmese some credit and
additional maneuvering space in occasions of need. Liang (1990:212-213)
observes this sensitivity in a 1967 event:: “While visiting Rangoon, then
Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam asked Ne Win outright if Burma intended
to join ASEAN. Ne Win replied that Burma
could not join ASEAN until all of the organization’s members recognized China, and all US
bases were removed from Thailand.”
Mutual gestures are often spotted. In a recent case when Burmese Foreign
Minister announced his government’s decision to forego ASEAN chairmanship,
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing cut short ARF[15]
meeting and visited Rangoon to underscore China’s
support to her neighbor. At a slightly lesser level of relationship with that
of China,
Indian-Burmese ties have been growing significantly in recent years, leaving
the fallouts suffered in early 1990s behind. India’s
“strategic equation”, as Ganesan (2005:40) termed it, has become a policy in
relation with her eastern neighbor to counter Chinese influence in Burma. The
junta leader General Than Swe visited India
in late 2004, and in his return, President Abdul Kalam visited Rangoon in early 2006.
Having secured two Asian power houses at their side plus Russia being an
occasional partner, Burmese generals have virtually neutralized international
pressure. In apparent recognition of this, US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently urges China
and India to do more on Burma[16].
We can now
summarize understandings we have established. We now know that, having learnt
from the patterns of foregoing ASEAN chairmanship and LDC application lobbying,
national pride can be taken out of the junta’s consistent and real concern.
Therefore the generals are left with their own weakness of insecurity and the
geopolitical strength which they earn from the scouting neighbors. The junta’s
recent actions of boasting security in fact indicates the growing sense of
insecurity in the ranks of military. Entire branch of Military Intelligence was
dismantled and replaced with the new Military Affairs Security Department
following the purge of powerful intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt. More
significantly, the junta has moved the country’s administrative capital to Naypyidaw (the city where the king
lives) partly for security reasons. Meanwhile, Burma’s neighbors are racing to lay
pipelines out to their borders for the gas they purchase from the resource rich
country and won’t seek anything to disappoint generals.
Based on the
understandings above, we are able to draw two hypothesizes. First, there is no best solution for Burma out of
this enduring situation. Giving current circumstances, the junta is the
only stakeholder of Burmese politics with power and in control of the
situation. Any solution or proposal without the junta’s participation will not
find a ground to start. On the other hand, the opposition and the ethnic
minorities who are also stakeholders see none of the junta’s policies including
Seven-step Roadmap[17]
are sustainable. Therefore it has become the forgone answer that currently
active policies and initiatives are doomed to survive only at the time when
generals are in control.
Second, external pressures insensitive to the
junta’s stand and position will not see results. That’s why neither
European Union’s travel ban on generals nor US’s investment pullouts yield
their objectives. So did the World Bank’s $1billion financial carrot which made
no headway other than becoming a political joke out of the regime’s rhetoric
rebuttal. International community, therefore, must pay attention to both
present
and past of the
regime as well as surrounding circumstances. Of course there have been
sanctions and aids that yielded the targeted outcome. UNDP’s opium eradication
and substitution crop program, Australian training program for government
officials on human rights and counter-terrorism, and worldwide money laundering
ban and US
government freezing the generals’ assets are those of rare successful
campaigns.
Burma has been
misunderstood in the outside world and remained largely mystical to many
including scholars and politicians. And it is pity that many Burmese, both
Burmans and ethnic alike, have not paid much attention in studying insights of
their country and about themselves. It was by mistake not by mystic that Burma
went down to find glory in golden past and embraced poverty instead. Ne Win
himself admitted policy mistakes in several occasions but had left the stage
without correcting. Accumulated hatred has thus directed at present regime
therefore those opposition politicians shall attempt defusing it and should
manage in favor of the nation’s sake, not by provoking Nuremberg[18]
trials. At the same time Burma
needs continuing international engagement, be it in the form of aid or
sanction, to remind generals and Burmese population that the world has not
forgotten their cause. Sanctions hurt not only ordinary citizens also affect
the regime. Generals themselves too one way or another would find out how
difficult to overcome economic turbulence in times when mismanagement and
corruption reap all deserved benefits to the nation into pockets of a few
individuals, and giving the fact that their phun
(glory) hasn’t been long in impression of Burmese. With constant international
and domestic pressure, generals of Burma will one day realize that
peace and unity they have longed for is achievable only by tolerance and
coexistence. Effective sanctions should be welcome. Effective aid should
continue to flow. There would never be a total failure of ASEAN or
international pressure in Burma
because a failed state in Burma
wouldn’t be an isolated one.
[2] The New Zealand
Herald, 10th June 2005. [http://nzherald.co.nz]
[3] Those
public gatherings are organized by USDA (Union Solidarity and Development
Association), the political arm of the junta. USDA is funded by the state and
civil servants are encouraged (often forced) to join the association and its
activities.
[4] People’s
Daily Online 22nd July 2006. [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn]
[5] David I.
Steinberg says “Nationalism as a traditional concept reinforced by colonial
oppression has become a central factor in political legitimacy and affects
negotiations in foreign relations and foreign assistance”, see bibliography :
Steinberg (2005:104)
[6] Foreign
Minister Win Aung’s “We are not monkeys” remarks are also well-known, in
ASIAWEEK, 25th December 1998.
[7] The
Burma Socialist Programme Party, founded by Ne Win and his generals after their
1962 coup.
[9] Michael
Aung-Thwin in his article “1948 And Burma’s Myth of Independence”, Aung-Thwin (1989:25)
[10]
Anthropological studies could contribute better understanding of Burmese
concept of power. Some discussion of phun
can be found in Aung-Thwin’s book “Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma” (1985)
and “Prophecies, Omens, and Dialogue: Tools of the Trade in Burmese
Historiography” (1982)
[11] Excerpt
from the English translation of the announcement: Ref- http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/The_Burmese_Way_to_Socialism.htm
[also with reference to: Rangoon,
April 28 1962, G,U.P.C,P.O, -- No. 48, Min. of Information, 28-4-62--600--Mono--VII. ]
[12] Lee
Kuan Yew recalled a dinner with Ne Win during his last visit to Rangoon in 1986. Lee
noted, “I found that despite Burma’s
20 years of economic stagnation, he was as distrustful of foreign powers as
ever.”
[13] The
State Peace and Development Council is the official name of the present day
military junta
[14] A
translation by the author of this article; every books and magazines published in
Burma
must carry the junta’s propaganda statements on the first page.
[15] ARF
(the ASEAN Regional Forum) is a annual security dialogue session between ANEAN
and its partners including US, China,
Japan and India
[16]
Condoleezza Rice urges China
and India
to put more pressure on military junta over its poor human rights records.
[Reuters March 28 2006]
[17] The seven-step roadmap to disciplined
democracy was announced by then Prime Minister Gen. Khin Nyunt on 30 August
2003
[18]
Possibility of Nuremberg
trials were raised by Kyi Maung, one of the opposition figures in an interview.
Taylor
(2005:27) said that would have signaled to the generals that possibility was
being considered by the NLD leadership. [also in Faulder (1990:28)]
Bibliography
1.
Aung-Thwin, Michael : Prophecies, Omens, and Dialogue:
Tools of the Trade in Burmese Historiography, in Moral Order and the Question
of Change: Essays on Southeast Asian Thought, Editors David K. Wyatt and
Alexander Woodside, Yale University Southeast Studies, New Heaven, 1982.
2.
Aung-Thwin, Michael : Pagan, The Origins of Modern Burma, Honolulu, University of Hawaii
Press, 1985.
3.
Aung-Thwin, Michael, 1948 and Burma’s Myth of Independence, in Independent
Burma at Forty Years: Six Assessments / Editor Josef Silverstein, Southeast Asia Program Cornell University,
New York, 1989
4.
Badgley, John: Burmese Ideology:
A Comment, in Independent Burma
at Forty Years: Six Assessments / Editor Josef Silverstein, Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, New York, 1989
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Lee, Kuan Yew : From Third World to First, The Singapore
Story: 1965-2000, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Time Media, Singapore 2000
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by Robert A. Scalapino. Burma's
foreign relations : neutralism in theory and practice, New York : Praeger, 1990.
8.
Steinberg, David I. Myanmar: The
Roots of Economic Malaise, in Myanmar
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H. Taylor, Tin Maung Maung Than Singapore : Institute of Southeast
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Taylor, Robert H.: Pathways to
the Present, in Myanmar :
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Taylor, Tin Maung Maung Than Singapore : Institute of Southeast
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1966
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